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A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: THE FCC PROVIDES
REGULATORY RELIEF IN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS
AND INTERNATIONAL SERVICES LICENSING
Paul W. Kenefick*
In spring 1999, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") released
two orders affecting its international settlements
policy and its policy of licensing U.S. carriers en-
gaged in international telecommunications serv-
ices.' Both orders were the result of the FCC In-
ternational Bureau's ("IB" or "Bureau") 1998
biennial regulatory review, as required under sec-
tion 11 of the Communications Act.2 In this re-
view, the International Bureau conducted a pub-
lic forum and held many informal meetings with
interested members of the telecommunications
community, including the Federal Communica-
tions Bar Association, to seek ideas to simplify,
streamline and eliminate burdens on the interna-
tional telecommunications industry and the Com-
mission. The Commission is required to conduct
a similar review in 2000.
This article will focus on the initiatives and im-
pact of the licensing reform and ISP reform or-
ders on the international telecommunications
community, how these orders affected their re-
spective issue areas and what can be accomplished
in the Year 2000 review. Part I will analyze the bi-
ennial review obligation of the Commission,
which was mandated by Congress-among other
regulatory reform initiatives-through Title IV of
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I See In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Reform of
the International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing
Requirements, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration,
14 FCC Rcd. 7963 (1999) [hereinafter ISP Reform Order]; In re
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of International
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.3 Part II pro-
vides a brief history of the Commission's licensing
of U.S. carriers engaged in the provision of inter-
national telecommunications, from the 1995 Mar-
ket Entry Order' through the implementation of
the World Trade Organization's Basic Telecom-
munications Agreement. 5 Part II also explores
how the 1999 Licensing Reform Order impacted this
system. Part III will focus on the Commission's in-
ternational settlements policy, which governs how
U.S. carriers compensate foreign carriers for the
exchange of switched traffic. This section will pro-
vide background on how the Commission's settle-
ments policy has regulated the exchange of inter-
national traffic and how the ISP Reform Order
impacts this regime. Finally, Part IV focuses on
how the biennial review impacted these regula-
tions and how the Commission could have pro-
vided more relief, and provides suggestions for
the next biennial review in 2000.
I. THE COMMISSION'S BIENNIAL REVIEW
OBLIGATIONS
Title IV of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
focused on regulatory reform of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 and the Commission's rules.6 In
Common Carrier Regulations, Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd.
4909 (1998) [hereinafter Licensing Reform Order].
2 See 47 U.S.C. § 161 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
3 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714).
4 In Re Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-affiliated
Entities, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3873 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Market Entry Order].
5 See World Trade Organization: Agreement on Telecom-
munications Services (Fourth Protocol to the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services) 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997) [hereinafter
WTO Basic Telecom Agreement].
6 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Title IV, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47
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addition to requiring in section 11 that the Com-
mission review its regulations every other year and
instituting several specific amendments to the
Act, 7 Title IV authorizes the Commission to for-
bear, with limited exceptions, from applying any
regulation or provision of the Act when certain
determinations are made.8 In assessing whether to
forbear, the Commission must determine that
such a rule or section of the Act is not necessary
to effectuate certain goals, that enforcement is
not necessary for the protection of consumers and
that forbearance is consistent with the public in-
terest.9 Section 10 directs the Commission to con-
sider whether forbearance will promote competi-
tive market conditions and enhance
competition.' 0 Interested parties, including tele-
communications carriers directly impacted by a
particular rule or provision of the Act, may file a
petition requesting that the Commission exercise
its forbearance authority. 1 The Commission must
act within a year on any petition for forbearance
unless an extension is granted and must explain
its refusal or acceptance of forbearance, in whole
or in part, on the record.12
Under Title IV of the 1996 Act, the Commission
must review, in every even-numbered year begin-
ning with 1998, all regulations issued under the
Act that apply to the activities of a telecommuni-
cations service provider.' 3 The review must deter-
mine whether the regulations remain in the pub-
lic interest after meaningful economic
competition has arisen between providers of such
service. 14 Upon review, the Commission is further
mandated to repeal or modify any regulation it
determines is no longer necessary to serve the
public interest. 
15
Unlike section 10, which provides the Commis-
sion authority to forbear from applying statutory
provisions if the mandated test under section
U.S.C). "
7 See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1)-(3) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
8 See 47 U.S.C. § 160 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
9 See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
10 See 47 U.S.C. § 160(b).
11 See 47 U.S.C. § 160(c).
12 See id.
3 See 47 U.S.C. § 161(a)
14 See id.
15 See 47 U.S.C.§ 161(b).
16 Seegenerally47 U.S.C. § 161.
17 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 161 & 162 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
18 See 1998 FCC Biennial Review Home Page (visited
Sept. 13, 1999) <www.fcc.gov/biennial>.
19 The other proceedings the FCC's International Bu-
10(a) is met, section 11 does not provide the
Commission with the authority to repeal or mod-
ify any statute or provision of the Act. 16 The bien-
nial review is strictly limited to regulatory initia-
tives and determinations that are at the discretion
of the Commission, but the authority to forbear
from applying a statutory obligation may be exer-
cised at any time.'
7
Beginning in January 1998, the Commission ini-
tiated a series of rulemaking proceedings as part
of its 1998 Biennial Regulatory review.' Thirty-
one different proceedings, in the Common Car-
rier, Wireless Telecommunications, Mass Media
and International Bureaus,19 were initiated subse-
quent to a "broad, comprehensive internal review
of all existing FCC regulations and informal input
from industry and the public." 20 These initiatives
were aimed at eliminating or modifying rules ad-
dressing such issues as the bundling of consumer
premises equipment with telecommunications
service, interlocking directorates between tele-
communications carriers and the cross ownership





In order to properly appreciate the impact of
the Commission's Licensing Reform Order, it is es-
sential to analyze the obligations and restrictions
placed on U.S. carriers that engage in the provi-
sion of international telecommunications ser-
vice-particularly those that are foreign-owned or
-affiliated. While for a number of years the Com-
mission has employed varying public interest tests
to determine whether an international service li-
cense application is in the public interest,22 The
reau initiated pursuant to Section 11(a) that are not dis-
cussed in this article address settlements in the maritime mo-
bile and maritime mobile-satellite radio services. See generally
In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Accounts
Settlement in the Maritime Mobile and Maritime Mobile-Sat-
ellite Radio Services and Withdrawal of the Commission as an
Accounting Authority in the Maritime Mobile and the Mari-
time Mobile-Satellite Radio Services Except for Distress and
Safety Communications, Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 13504 (1999).
21 FCC Staff Proposes 31 Proceedings as Part of 1998 Bi-
ennial Regulatory Review (Rpt. No. GN 98-1), FCC News,
Feb. 5, 1998.
21 See id.
22 See, e.g., effective competitive opportunities ("ECO")
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Market Entry Order23 is often considered the begin-
ning of a new era and the pinnacle of regulation
in this area. This order, which instituted a rigor-
ous test for foreign carrier entry into the U.S.
market for international telecommunications, ini-
tiated the Commission's streamline of the applica-
tion review process and entry criteria (with the ex-
ception of its benchmark settlement rate policy).
This streamlining was ultimately achieved
through the Streamlining Order,24 the implementa-
tion of the WTO's Fourth Protocol to the General
Agreement on Trade in Services 25 in the Commis-
sion's Foreign Participation Order,26 and eventually
with the biennial review's Licensing Reform Order
27
A. Licensing Prior to the Market Entry Order
The Commission is under a statutory obligation
to ensure (1) that the grant of Section 21428 au-
thority is consistent with the public convenience
and necessity29 and (2) that the grant of a section
310(b) (4)30 application, a request to exceed the
twenty-five percent indirect foreign ownership
benchmark in radio licenses, is consistent with the
public interest.
Prior to the Market Entry Order, the Comnission
"evaluated foreign ownership in U.S. telecommu-
nications carriers and radio licenses on an ad hoc
basis. 3 1 For carriers seeking authority to provide
international telecommunications service on a fa-
cilities or resale basis, the Commission balanced
its policy in favor of open market entry against the
potential for discrimination against unaffiliated
standard discussed infra. ECO is a two-pronged dejure/defacto
analysis of whether entry serves the public interest, conven-
ience and necessity. See id.
23 11 FCC Rcd. at 3875.
24 In re Streamlining the International Section 214 Au-
thorization Process and Tariff Requirements, Report and Or-
der, 11 FCC Rcd. 12884 (1996) [hereinafter Streamlining Or-
der].
25 See generally WfO Basic Telecom Agreement, supra note 6.
26 See In re Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in
the U.S. Telecommunications Market; Market Entry and Reg-
ulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, Report and Order and Or-
der on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd. 23891 (1997), recon. pend-
ing [hereinafter Foreign Participation Order].
27 14 FCC Rcd. 4909 (1998).
28 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (providing the
Commission with its general licensing authority).
29 Section 214(a) of the Communications Act states,
No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line
or of an extension of any line, or shall acquire or oper-
ate any line, or extension thereof, or shall engage in
transmission over or by means of such additional or ex-
U.S. carriers by the foreign carrier's parent.32
Under section 310(b) (4), the Commission consid-
ered several factors for applicants wishing to ex-
ceed the twenty-five percent indirect foreign own-
ership benchmark. 33 Some factors include
national security issues, the extent of alien partici-
pation, the type of radio license sought and the
extent to which the investment would further the
Commission's policies at the time.3 4 At the time,
no clear entry criteria were available for foreign
carriers to enter the market.
B. The Market Entry Order
On November 30, 1995, the Commission re-
leased its Market Entry Order, which set forth entry
criteria as part of its overall public interest analysis
under section 214 of the Act.3 5 The Commission
believed the entry criteria were necessary to pro-
mote effective competition in the U.S. market for
international telecommunications services.3 6 Ac-
cording to this order, the public interest de-
manded opportunities for all U.S. carriers to in-
novate in the provision of international services-
including their entry into foreign markets-and
limits on the ability of dominant foreign carriers
to leverage their market power in the U.S. mar-
ket.3 7 Further, this order examined applications
by foreign-affiliated entities for licenses of com-
mon carrier radio facilities under section
310(b) (4) of the Act in a similar fashion. 8
At the heart of the Commission's Market Entry
Order was the establishment of the effective com-
tended line, unless and until there shall first have been
obtained from the Commission a certificate that the
present or future public convenience and necessity re-
quire or will require the construction, or operation, or
construction and operation, of such additional or ex-
tended line[.]
47 U.S.C. § 214(a). Colloquially, the Commission and indus-
try participants refer to a license to provide international ser-
vice as a "214 license."
30 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
' I Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23910, para.
45.
32 See Market Entry Order,11 FCC Rcd. at 3878, paras.
10-19.
33 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23910,
para. 45
34 See id.
35 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3875, para. 1.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 3964, para. 238.
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petitive opportunities analysis ("ECO") to deter-
mine whether a foreign affiliated carrier's entry
into the U.S. market is in the public interest.3 9
ECO is a two-pronged test: The first prong ad-
dresses whether U.S. carriers have the legal ability
to enter the destination market of the applicant
(de jure ability to enter). 40 The second prong is
comprised of three elements that examine
whether U.S. carriers have the actual ability to
enter the destination market of the applicant (de
facto ability to enter). 4' Specifically, the first ele-
ment focuses on the terms and conditions of in-
terconnection with the incumbent's network and
whether any barriers to interconnection exist in
the market. 42 The second element focuses on
competitive safeguards that have been put in
place by the regulatory or competition authority
in the destination market to ensure that the in-
cumbent does not leverage its market power to
disadvantage a U.S. carrier in this market.
43-
Under the third element, ECO examines the reg-
ulatory framework of the incumbent market to de-
-9 See id. at 3884-88, paras. 27-39.
40 See id. at 3890, para. 44. In its application of the dejure
prong of ECO, the Commission has examined such legal en-
try barriers as the existence of limitations on the number of
licenses to be rewarded or foreign ownership restrictions on
such licenses. See id; see also In re Telecom New Zealand Lim-
ited ("TNZL"), Order, Authorization and Certificate, 12 FCC
Rcd. 19379, 19384, para. 11 (1996).
41 See Market Entry Order, II FCC Rcd. at 3890, para. 44.
42 See id. at 3892, para. 49.
43 See id. at 3892, para. 51. The safeguards considered in
the Commission's application of ECO have included "(1) the
existence of cost-allocation rules to prevent cross-subsidiza-
tion; (2) timely and nondiscriminatory disclosure of techni-
cal information needed to use, or interconnect with, carriers'
facilities; and (3) protection of carrier and customer proprie-
tary information." See id; see also In re Hong Kong Telecom-
munications (Pacific) Limited ("HKTP"), Order and Authoriza-
tion, 13 FCC Rcd. 20050, 20064, para. 33 (1998); In re Hong
Kong Telecommunications (Pacific) Limited ("HKTP"), Or-
der on Reconsideration, DA 99-1481 (July 28, 1999).
44 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3894, para. 54.
45 See ISP Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 7965-66, para. 8
n.8 (defining the accounting rate as "the price a U.S. facili-
ties-based carrier negotiates with a foreign carrier for han-
dling one minute of international telephone service. Each
carrier's portion of the accounting rate is referred to as the
settlement rate. In almost all cases, the settlement rate is
equal to one-half the negotiated accounting rate.").
46 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3890, para. 44.
47 In determining "market power," the Commission ex-
amined the following factors: (1) the market share of the ap-
plicant's affiliate in the destination market, (2) the supply
elasticity of the destination market, (3) the demand elasticity
of the customer in the destination market and (4) the for-
eign carrier affiliate's "cost structure, size and resources." In
re Application of KDD America, Order, Authorization and Certif-
termine whether the regulator and the incum-
bent are jointly controlled or independent
entities and whether the regulator has the power
to enforce the first three elements of ECO.44 The
ECO analysis balances all four elements with
other public interest factors-such as cost-based
accounting rates 45 or evidence of existing compe-
tition-that are entered into the record to deter-
mine whether the application is in the public in-
terest.
46
ECO did not apply to all situations in which a
foreign carrier sought access to the U.S. interna-
tional telecommunications market. The Commis-
sion applied the ECO analysis only if the appli-
cant was affiliated with a foreign carrier with
market power operating in the destination mar-
ket.47 Further, it rejected a control standard for
affiliation 48 and determined that a U.S. carrier
was affiliated with a foreign carrier if the foreign
carrier had a twenty-five percent or greater equity
interest in the U.S. carrier applying for the li-
cense, or a controlling interest at any level.49 The
icate, 11 FCC Rcd. 11329, 11334, para. 10 (1996). Two factors
determine supply elasticity: (1) the supply of capacity of ex-
isting competitors and (2) low entry barriers. See In re Motion
of AT&T to be Declared Nondominant for International Ser-
vice, Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 17963, 17980-81, para. 48 (1996).
High demand elasticities indicate a customer's willingness
and ability to switch to or from the carrier in order to obtain
price reductions and desired features. See In re Cable & Wire-
less, Inc., Order, Authorization and Certificate, 11 FCC Rcd.
16486, 16492-93, at para. 9 n.41 (1996).
48 The Commission had previously held that "...control
is the proper standard for determining affiliation for the pur-
poses of deciding whether a U.S. common carrier should be
regulated as dominant or nondominant in its provision of
U.S. international service." In re Regulation of International
Common Carrier Services, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 7331,
7332 (1992) [hereinafter International Services Order]. In the
International Services Order, the Commission determined that
without control of a U.S. carrier, the foreign carrier would
not be in a position to direct the actions of the U.S. carrier.
See id. Control is not defined by what it is, rather than what it
is not. The Commission held it would assess whether the for-
eign carrier had "control" of the U.S. carrier on a case-by-
case basis since the variety of stock ownership situations
made an ownership percentage benchmark unreliable. See
id. at 7333, para. 13.
49 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3873, para. 78. The
Commission retained the authority to review investments that
are less than twenty-five percent and potentially subject these
to ECO. See id. at 3906, paras. 88-89. Although subjecting
such investments to regulatory review would create some reg-
ulatory uncertainty, the Commission reasoned that "in a mar-
ket such as international telecommunications where some
players possess significant market power, the potential exists
for substantial investments below 25 percent level to have a
dramatic impact on competition in certain limited circum-
stances." Id. at 3906, para. 89.
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affiliation had to be with a foreign carrier provid-
ing telecommunications service, not simply any
foreign interest,50 and this foreign carrier affiliate
had to be operating in the applicant's destination
market.51 Finally, the affiliate had to have market
power, which was defined as the ability of the car-
rier to act anticompetitively against unaffiliated
U.S. carriers through the control of bottleneck
services or facilities at the foreign end.
52
The Market Entry Order also addressed a foreign-
affiliated entry test for common carrier radio
licenses under section 310(b) (4) of the Act. 5 3 Sec-
tion 310(b)(4) permits corporations with up to
one-fourth foreign ownership of capital stock to
control common carrier, aeronautical or broad-
cast licenses, but it instructs the Commission to
make a public interest determination in granting
licenses to corporations that are more than
twenty-five percent foreign-controlled. 54 In the
Market Entry Order, the Commission determined
that the public interest demanded that applicants
for common carrier radio licenses be subject to an
ECO test, where it identified a "home market" for
each foreign investor, 55 compared appropriate
market segments56 and applied the de jure and de
facto prongs to these segments. 57 Although the
Commission adopted the ECO test to determine
whether foreign interests could control more
50 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3911, para. 99
n.120. "A foreign carrier" is defined as "any entity that is au-
thorized within a foreign country to engage in the provision
of international telecommunications services offered to the
public in that country within the meaning of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Regulations." Id. This includes
foreign carriers that provide intercity or local access services
or facilities in a foreign country. See id.
51 The Commission rejected applying the ECO test to all
markets, even those where the applicant did not have an affil-
iate, since this could deny entry where there was little or no
threat to competition. See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at
3917, para. 117. The Commission also rejected the "home
market" test, which would limit ECO to the applicant's home
or primary market and not others, although the applicant
could have market power in these markets. See id. at 3918,
para. 119.
52 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3917, para. 116
(defining bottleneck services or facilities "as those that are
necessary for the provision of international services, includ-
ing intercity or local access facilities on the foreign end").
53 See id. at 3941-56, paras. 179-219.
54 See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (4) (1994 & Supp. 111997). Sec-
tion 310 states that
no broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en
route or aeronautical fixed radio station license shall be
granted or held by ... any corporation directly or indi-
rectly controlled by any other corporation of which
more than one-fourth of the capital stock is owned of
than twenty-five percent of a common carrier ra-
dio licensee (e.g., a wireless telephony license), it
refused to adopt the test for determining whether
similar investments in broadcast and aeronautical
licenses were in the public interest.
58
In establishing ECO, the FCC seemed to articu-
late a policy of open and fair trade in the telecom-
munications services market,59 but in fact it er-
ected trade protection barriers for the largest of
the U.S. carriers and provided itself with more
regulatory obligations than it could satisfy. The
support of the larger U.S. carriers, 61 who provide
a majority of the international facilities-based serv-
ices from the U.S., was not exclusively due to a
strong public policy belief that foreign markets
must be opened. ECO provided an opportunity
for them to delay the inevitable entry of foreign
competition in the U.S. international telecommu-
nications market. Until the implementation of the
WTO Basic Telecom Agreement (at the opposition of
the largest U.S. international carrier), U.S. carri-
ers employed such ambiguous standards under
ECO as the definition of "market power" and the
evidentiary showings necessary under the ECO
test to oppose these applications and delay the au-
thorization of potential foreign-affiliated competi-
tors. 61 The ECO analysis resulted in delay because
the Commission was required to release an order
record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a
foreign government or representative thereof, or by any
corporation organized under the laws of a foreign coun-
try, if the Commission finds that the public interest will
be served by the refusal or revocation of such license.
Id.
55 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3951, paras.
206-07.
56 See id. at 3953, para. 212.
57 See id. at 3953, para. 213.
58 See id. at 3945, paras. 190-96.
59 See In re Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-affili-
ated Entities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 4844,
4845, para. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Market Entry Order NPRM].
In the NPRM, the Commission set out three goals: "(1) pro-
mote effective competition in the global market for commu-
nications services; (2) prevent anticompetitive conduct in the
provision of international services or facilities; and (3) en-
courage foreign governments to open their communications
markets." Id. In the Market Entry Order, the Commission stated
it would adhere to these goals, with an emphasis on the pro-
moting effective competition in the U.S. telecommunications
services market. 11 FCC Rcd. at 3877, para. 8.
60 See id. at 3883, para. 25 n.22 (listing commenting par-
ties to the Market Entry Order NPRM that supported some ver-
sion of the ECO test).




for each application filed by a foreign-affiliated
carrier. These orders made determinations-and
provided future applicants with Commission pre-
cedent-as to whether the foreign affiliate had
market power and/or whether the scrutinized
market met the ECO standard. Regardless of the
FCC's determinations, the applicants business
plans suffered due to the inherent delays that ac-
companied these licensing criteria and proce-
dures.
C. International 214 Streamlining Order
A few months after releasing the Market Entry
Order, the Commission released its Streamlining Or-
der, which provided the telecommunications com-
munity with guidance on the application process
and streamlined many of the requirements for ob-
taining a license to provide international ser-
vice.62 This order introduced the "Global 214," an
application U.S. carriers can submit for the provi-
sion of services to all international points as long
as they are not affiliated with a foreign carrier in
any destination markets that would require a mar-
ket power or ECO demonstration. 63 These appli-
cations are placed on streamlined review, that is,
they are deemed granted if there are no objec-
tions from the Commission or another party
within a certain number of days after the applica-
tion is placed on public notice. 64 Unaffiliated U.S.
carriers received the most benefit from the Global
214.65 Foreign-affiliated U.S. carriers could apply
for such licenses only as long as their applications
excluded international points where there was an
affiliation with a foreign carrier. 66 For example, a
U.S. carrier affiliated with the dominant carrier in
a particular foreign country could receive global
authority to provide service to all destinations but
the country of affiliation. The carrier could subse-
quently attempt to garner authority on the affili-
62 See generally Streamlining Order, II FCC Rcd. 12884.
63 See id. at 12889, para. 11.
64 See id. at 12891-92, para. 14.
65 WorldCom mentioned in its comments filed in the
Streamlining proceeding, that under the proposed rules it
would only have to file one global application and several
specialized ones, rather than the more than 500 it had filed
prior to the implementation of the Global 214. See id. at
12888, para. 9.
66 See id. at 12884, para. 12.
67 See id. at 12890, para. 12.
68 See generally Streamlining Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 12884.
69 See id. at 12891, para. 14.
70 See id.
ated route through a separate application subject
to theECO test.
67
The Streamlining Order made the Commission's
licensing regulations more efficient and partially
addressed the resources problem with the ECO
test.68 Non-affiliated carriers' applications would
be streamlined and approved, and the carriers
permitted to operate within thirty-six days of the
date of Public Notice.6 "' A separately written order
was not necessary, thus saving Commission re-
sources for those applications subject to the ECO
analysis.
1
However, foreign-affiliated carriers remained
subject to a different standard that handicapped
their entry. Whereas an unaffiliated U.S. carrier
could apply for and receive international author-
ity in less than two months, a foreign-affiliated car-
rier's application would have to include informa-
tion meeting the ECO criteria. 71 In addition, the
foreign-affiliated carrier was more likely to be sub-
ject to the objections of competing U.S. carriers
and require a written authorization by the Com-
mission.
D. World Trade Organization Basic
Telecommunications Agreement
On February 15, 1997, the WTO Basic Telecom-
munications Agreement was concluded. Sixty-
nine nations, 72 including the United States and
most of its major trading partners-representing
ninety percent of worldwide telecommunications
service revenue-committed to opening their
markets for basic telecommunications services. 73
The WO Basic Telecom Agreement is not a stand-
alone agreement, rather it is incorporated into
the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices ("GATS").74 In the agreement, signatories
made varying degrees of commitments to open
their markets for international telecommunica-
71 See id.
72 In addition to its fifteen members, the European
Union is also bound, raising the number of the contracting
parties to the Basic Telecom Agreement to seventy. See Laura
B. Sherman, "Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First Multilateral
Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications Services, 51 FED.
COMM. L.J. 61, 62 n.3 (1998). Although China is not a mem-
ber of the WTO, Hong Kong remains a member despite its
July 1999 remission to China by virtue of its status as a sepa-
rate customs territory of the People's Republic of China. See
id.
73 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23893,
para. 2.
74 See Sherman, supra note 72, at 62.
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tions and satellite services. 75
Fifty members agreed to adopt the Reference
Paper,7 6 which sets out procompetitive regulatory
principles. An additional ten members committed
to adopting either part or all of these principles in
the near future. 7 7 The principles of the Reference
Paper include interconnection provisions, compe-
tition safeguards, transparency of licensing crite-
ria, universal service policies, independence of
the regulator and allocation of scarce resources.
78
These safeguards were created to prevent monop-
olies of basic telecommunication from exploiting
"their dominant position to distort market forces
and impede the ability of competitors to supply
networks or services for which commitments
would be made."79 The negotiators realized that a
comprehensive approach to regulatory reform
was needed because the telecommunications laws
and regulations in most countries did not foster a
competitive marketplace since most had been
designed when telecommunications had been
monopolized by the state.80
The FCC subsequently implemented the com-
mitments made by the United States in its Foreign
Participation Order.8 1 The Commission divided the
applicants between WTO member nations, which
received significant regulatory relief, and non-
WTO member nations,8 " which remained subject
to the ECO analysis in effect at the time of the
implementation of the order.83 As a result, appli-
cants for Section 214 authority from WTO mem-
ber nations, seeking authority to exceed the sec-
tion 310(b)(4) foreign ownership benchmark,
75 See WTO Basic Telecom Agreement, supra note 6, at 1169.
Regardless of the commitments made by the individual coun-
tries under the Basic Telecom Agreement, Articles II (Most
Favored Nation) and XVII (National Treatment) of CATS
demand WTO members treat like services and service suppli-
ers from other WTO members no less favorably than they
treat their own services and service suppliers. See id.
76 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23903,
para. 27. The Reference Paper was never formally issued as a
WTO document. See id. For a description of the Reference
Paper, see Sherman, supra note 72, at 71-86.
77 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23903,
para. 27.
78 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 24039,
para. 340.
79 Sherman, supra note 72, at 71.
80 See Taunya L. McLarty, Liberalized Telecommunications
Trade in the WfO: Implications for Universal Service Policy, 51
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 49 (1998).
81 See generally Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
23891.
82 See id. at 23893, para. 2.
and applicants seeking a cable landing license 84
are no longer required to make an ECO showing.
Instead, these applicants are subject to a rebutta-
ble presumption that as WTO members, they do
not pose concerns that would justify denial of an
application on competitive grounds.8 5 Any an-
ticompetitive concerns raised during the applica-
tion process by the Commission would be ad-
dressed through license denial only if its
dominant carrier safeguards and individualized li-
cense conditions could not prevent such activity.8"i
Under the guise of the protections offered
under the WrO Basic Telecom Agreement, the Foreign
Participation Order addressed two of the major
problems with ECO-trade protectionism and
regulatory obligations.87 First, by fully embracing
the WFO Basic Telecom Agreement and substantially
deregulating foreign carrier entry from WTO
member nations, regardless of the carrier's coun-
try commitments under the agreement, the Com-
mission's policies reflected a move towards reli-
ance upon competition rather than strict
regulatory supervision. 88 While ECO's primary
goal was to protect U.S. carriers from the competi-
tive pressures of foreign entry, the benefits of an
open-entry policy were denied to consumers by
precluding these competitive pressures.89 The re-
buttable presumption offered to applicants from
WTO member nations provided further stream-
lining in the application process by reducing the
regulatory obligations the Commission made
when it enacted ECO.9° The Commission would
have to conduct an ECO analysis and draft an or-
83 See id. at 23904, paras. 29-30.
84 The Commission's authority to grant licenses and op-
eration of submarine cables is granted by the President pur-
suant to the Cable Landing License Act, not the Communica-
tions Act. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 34-39 (1994 & Supp. II 1997),
Exec. Order No. 10530, reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C. § 301
app. at 459-60 (1994). In the Foreign Participation Order, the
Commission initiated an open entry policy, instead of the
ECO analysis, with regard to applications from WTO mem-
ber nations to land and operate submarine cables in the
United States. See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at
23933, para. 93. However, submarine cable landing licenses
still must obtain the approval of the State Department pursu-
ant to E.O. 10,530, regardless of their WTO membership. See
3 U.S.C. § 301 app. at 459-60.
85 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23913,
para. 50.
86 See id. at 23913-15, paras. 51-54.
87 See id. at 23904, paras. 29-30.
88 See id. at 23907, para. 38.
89 See id. at 23906, para. 35.
90 See id. at 23906, para. 33.
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der only for an applicant affiliated with a foreign
carrier with market power in a non-WTO member
nation. In less than three years, the Commission
significantly reduced the workload in the licens-
ing arena, providing it with the ability to focus its
resources on actual cases of anticompetitive be-
havior, rather than the theoretical possibility in
every application.
E. 1999 Licensing Reform Order
After a thorough review of its regulations in the
Licensing Reform Order, the Commission further
provided easier entry for new carriers and more
flexibility for existing carriers. 91 The broad appli-
cation of the ECO test, which provided incum-
bent U.S. carriers with an popular regulatory tool
to delay competition, and the obligation to re-
lease individual orders for each foreign-affiliated
carrier now seem like a distant memory. The Li-
censing Reform Order is the culmination of the
Commission's efforts to eliminate self-imposed
trade barriers and to streamline its licensing pro-
cess.
The Licensing Reform Orderwas released after the
Commission conducted a public forum and many
informal meetings with interested members of the
community to examine ways to simplify and elimi-
nate burdens on the industry and the Commis-
sion.9 2 The order further streamlined the section
214 licensing process by (1) reducing the stream-
lined time period from thirty-five to fourteen
days 9 3 (2) expanding the class of applications
subject to streamlining 94 and (3) no longer re-
moving applications from streamlined review
solely due to the filing of a petition to deny.95 By
expanding the class of applications eligible for
streamlined review to include those on affiliated
routes where the carrier has only resale or mobile
9' See Licensing eform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 4909, 4912-33,
paras. 8-56 (streamlining section 214 authorizations and al-
lowing forbearance for proforma assignments and transfers of
control).
92 See generally Licensing Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 4909.
93 See id. at 4912, para. 9.
94 See id. at 4918, para. 20.
95 See id. at 4912-13, para. 9.
96 See supra note 45, defining accounting rates and settle-
ments rates.
97 See In re International Settlement Rates, Report and Or-
der, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806 (1997) [hereinafter Benchmarks Or-
der]; In re International Settlement Rates, Report and Order on
Reconsideration and Order Lifting Stay, 14 FCC Rcd. 9256
(1999) [hereinafter Benchmarks Reconsideration Order].
facilities, the Commission narrowed the scope of a
possible ECO analysis and the need to issue indi-
vidualized orders for a great number of applica-
tions. Further, the Commission's refusal to auto-
matically remove applications from streamlined
review solely due to the submission of a petition
to deny, regardless of the merits of such a peti-
tion, marked an important step in reducing the
ability of U.S. carriers to delay competition on a
particular route.
By summer 1999, the Commission's entry poli-
cies shifted from protecting incumbent U.S. carri-
ers from foreign entry into the U.S. market with
its enactment of ECO, toward an open entry pol-
icy where all carriers, regardless of affiliation, can
enter the market in a more efficient manner. Yet
the Commission had not adopted a completely
"open-entry" regulatory structure for all foreign
carriers in all circumstances. Several issues pre-
cluding this competitive model should be ad-
dressed in the Commission's Year 2000 biennial
review.
III. SETTLEMENT RATES
The accounting rate system defines how inter-
national carriers settle accounts with each other
for the exchange of international switched traf-
fic. 96 The Commission set out guidelines for set-
ting accounting rates in the Benchmarks Order,
97
which unilaterally imposed caps on the amount
U.S. carriers can compensate foreign administra-
tions for the termination of U.S. traffic.
The FCC heard the first accounting rate case in
1936. The case addressed "whipsawing," an an-
ticompetitive activity that harms U.S. telegraph
carriers.98 In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company,
Inc.,99 the FCC refused to grant Mackay Radio's
section 214 application because the proposed ra-
98 Whipsawing occurs when competitive U.S. carriers
send traffic to a foreign country where communications serv-
ices are controlled by a defacto or de jure monopolist, often
referred to as a PTr. See In re Uniform Settlement Rates on
Parallel International Communications Routes, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d. 121, 122, para. 4 (1980)
[hereinafter Uniform Settlement Rates Order]. The PTT receives
a certain amount of international traffic from each U.S. car-
rier but is under no obligation to send proportional return
traffic or charge equal termination costs. See id. When the
PTT favors one U.S. carrier over another with its return traf-
fic, it exerts its monopoly power over these carriers, thus
harming competition. See id.
99 2 F.C.C. 592 (1936), affd. sub. nom. Mackay Radio and
Telegraph Co., Inc. v. FCC, 97 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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dio circuit between the United States and Norway
would not generate additional traffic but would
merely shift the routing of existing traffic from
cable to radio circuits."' Mackay had agreed to
offer Norway a higher accounting rate if it sent all
U.S.-bound telegraph traffic through its radio cir-
cuit instead of the transatlantic cables used by
other U.S. carriers for their Norway-bound traf-
fic.' 0 ' The FCC determined this arrangement
would eliminate the U.S.-Norway cable traffic of
another carrier and cause ruinous competition
among U.S.-based international communications
carriers. 102
As a direct result of the Mackay case, the FCC
created the Uniform Settlements Policy ("USP")
in the 1930s.10 3 Under this policy, U.S. interna-
tional carriers offering identical services to the
same foreign point had to do so under identical
accounting rates, settlement rates and division of
tolls.10 4 Also, the international record carriers
were prohibited from negotiating exclusive rates
or receiving a disproportionate amount of return
traffic from the foreign correspondent.10 5 This
uniformity requirement ensures that service prov-
iders receive fair compensation for their services
and that foreign administrations are prevented
from whipsawing U.S. correspondents. 06
The dramatic increase in settlement rate defi-
cits and the asymmetry of accounting rates began
in the 1980s and continued into the 1990s.
10 7
During this period, U.S. regulators began to focus
on the problem of disproportionate accounting
rates and began to develop various remedies. In
1980, the FCC issued a policy statement reaffirm-
ing the need for the USP but stated that the pub-
lic interest may warrant waivers of the policy in
certain cases.' 08 In 1986, the FCC changed the
100 See Mackay Radio, 2 F.C.C. at 600.
101 See id. at 596.
102 See id.
103 See CHARLES H. KENNEDY & M. VERONICA PASTOR, AN
INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAl TELECOMMUNIATIONS LAw
126 (1996).
104 See id.
105 See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 43.51, 64.10001 (1996).
106 See Stuart Z. Chiron and Lise A Rehberg, Fostering
Competition in International Telecommunications, 38 FED. COMM.
L.J. 1, 45. (1987). Foreign administrations may whipsaw U.S.
carriers by indicating that unless certain terms or conditions
of their operating agreements are changed the inbound traf-
fic to that particular operator will decrease. See id. This de-
crease in inbound traffic will adversely impact the revenue of
the U.S. operator. See id.
107 The U.S. balance of payments deficit grew from $312
name of the USP to the International Settlements
Policy ("ISP") and simplified and streamlined the
waiver process.1 09
A. Modern-Day Accounting Rate Regulation
Until the ISP Reform Order was released in 1999,
the ISP was codified in sections 43.511 10 and
64.1001111 of the Commission's rules. These sec-
tions regulated the operating agreements, which
are basically private contracts between a U.S. in-
ternational carrier and a foreign carrier. With the
exception of the mandatory benchmark settle-
ment rate ceilings imposed in 1997,112 the FCC
does not dictate prices the U.S. carrier may con-
tract with a foreign carrier. However, it does de-
mand that the carrier file the operating agree-
ments with the FCC, and that these contracts
adhere to proportional return and nonexclusivity
regulations.
Section 43.51 required all U.S. non-dominant
carriers who entered into an operating agreement
with another carrier to provide foreign communi-
cations to file a copy of the agreement with the
Commission within thirty days of execution.' 13
Operating agreements include provisions con-
cerning the division of tolls, the basis of settle-
ment of traffic balances and the accounting rates.
If the operating agreement or an amendment to
an existing agreement included a division of tolls,
accounting rates or other items not identical to
the equivalent terms and conditions in the operat-
ing agreement of another U.S. carrier, the filing
carrier had to file a notification letter or waiver
request with the International Bureau pursuant to
section 64.1001. 14
If the rate is simply lower and there are no
million in 1979 to $2.4 billion in 1989. See Kenneth B. Stan-
ley, Balance of Payments, Deficits, and Subsidies in International
Communications Services: A New Challenge to Regulation, 43 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 411, 414. (1991). The cumulative deficit for the
period was $12.5 billion, most of it accruing from 1985 to
1989. See id.
108 See Uniform Settlement Rates Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 121,
para. 1.
109 See In re Implementation and Scope of the Uniform
Settlements Policy for Parallel Routes, Final Rule, 51 Fed.
Reg. 4736 (Feb. 7, 1986).
110 47 C.F.R. § 43.51 (1996).
III 47 C.F.R. § 64.1001 (1996).
112 See infra Part III.C.
113 See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51(a) (1996).
114 See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51(d) (1996).
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other modifications, such as an increase in return
traffic, then the carrier had to file a notification
letter under section 64.1001(e), stating the new
rate and noting that there has been no other
.modification in the operating agreement.' 15 If the
operating agreement included a difference that
was not a simple rate reduction, the carrier had to
file a waiver request under section 64.1001(f).'I1,'
This waiver request had to thoroughly explain the
proposed modifications in the operating agree-
ment with the foreign carrier. 117 Both notification
letters and waiver requests should have included
statements that the filing carrier had not bar-
gained for exclusive availability of the new ac-
counting rate or bargained for more than its pro-
portionate share of return traffic.' 18 The carrier
also had to state that it had informed the foreign
administration that U.S. policy required that com-
peting U.S. carriers have access to accounting
rates on a nondiscriminatory basis.' '19
In 1996, the Commission authorized U.S. carri-
ers to negotiate alternative settlement arrange-
ments that deviated from the requirements of the
ISP with any foreign correspondent carrier in a
country that satisfied the ECO test.'2 0 The Com-
mission would consider other alternative settle-
ments arrangements to countries that had not sat-
isfied ECO if the applicant could demonstrate
that such a deviation would promote market-ori-
ented pricing and competition while precluding
the abuse of market power by the foreign corre-
spondent.121 These criteria were amended in the
Foreign Participation Order when the Commission
replaced ECO as the threshold standard for deter-
mining when to permit accounting rate flexibility
with carriers from WTO member nations, with a
rebuttable presumption that flexibility is permit-
ted for carriers from WTO member nations. 122
115 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1001(e) (1996).
116 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1001(f) (1996).
117 See id.
1 18 See id.
119 47 C.F.R. § 64.1001(g) (1996).
120 See In re Regulation of International Accounting
Rates, Phase II, Fourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20063,
para. 2 (1996) [hereinafter Flexibility Order].
121 See id.
122 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 24026,
para. 302.
123 The ITU is a specialized agency of the United Na-
tions that was originally founded in the 19th Century to uni-
versalize telegraph service among nations. See KENNEDY & PAS-
TOR, supra note 103, at 30-31. Today, the ITU provides
oversight to international matters concerning telecommuni-
No international organization has the authority
to enforce or adjudicate accounting rates. The In-
ternational Telegraph and Telephone Consulta-
tive Committee ("CCITT") of the International
Telecommunications Union ("ITU") 123 had estab-
lished a set of recommendations for international
service, providing the basis for dividing revenue
from international communications service be-
tween countries. 124 In 1992, the CCITT approved
Recommendation D.140, which recommended
that accounting rates reflect the cost of providing
the service and that they are not discriminatory
between operators. '2 5 However, this recommen-
dation is not binding because the ITU does not
possess enforcement or dispute resolution author-
ity. The FCC has since established mandatory set-
tlement rate benchmarks for U.S. carriers. 1
26
B. Settlement Rate Deficit
The asymmetry between accounting and collec-
tion rates has reached a point where settlement
payments are a substantial factor in the United
States trade deficit. The decrease in settlement
rates and telecommunications costs are reflected
in lower collection rates, the rates customers pay.
Settlement payments have steadily increased and
recently leveled off even though accounting rates
and telecommunications costs have decreased
substantially. 127 There is no single factor that is a
catalyst to these disproportionate rates; instead,
there is a multitude of factors. Some are artifi-
cially created by foreign operators and govern-
ments, such as taxation of telecommunications
services, but many are unintentional results of
market forces.1
28
The international settlement payments deficit
increases when accounting rates do not decrease
cations standards, radio matters, and international develop-
ment. See id. at 32. The CCITT represents the telecommuni-
cations standardization sector of the ITU and is now referred
to as the "ITU-T." See id.
124 See Stanley, supra note 107, at 414-15.
125 See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 104, at 131-32.
126 See generally Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806;
Benchmarks" Reconsideration Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 9256.
127 See FCC INTERNAFIONAL BUREAU, REPORT ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS 1999 UPDATE,Jan. 14,
2000 available at <www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/International/Re-
ports/tmreport.pdf>.
128 See Robert M. Frieden, Accounting Rates: The Business
of International Telecommunications and the Incentive to Cheat, 43
FED. COMM. L.J 111, 117-18 (1991).
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proportionally with the cost of international
switched services. The FCC reported that between
1985 and 1994, U.S. carriers paid a total of $26
billion in settlement payments to foreign carriers;
nearly half of these payments were thought to
have exceeded the actual costs of terminating
calls. 1 29 Since 1985, the net settlement outpay-
ment has quadrupled, reaching over $5.45 billion
in 1997.130 In 1988, it was estimated that three out
of every four dollars that U.S. carriers collected
for international calls were owed to the foreign
carrier for terminating the calls.13 1 The ITU has
estimated that, of the $55 billion spent on inter-
national phone calls by each country in 1995, only
$30 billion was needed to cover costs.
1 32
Foreign PTTs and governments directly cause
some of the disparity in accounting rates and traf-
fic. The primary institutional structure aggravat-
ing the U.S. deficit in this area is the subsidy some
PTTs have built into the cost of terminating calls
from the United States. These payments often
subsidize local telephone service, postal opera-
tions, and even such programs as currency sol-
vency that are ancillary to international telecom-
munications. 1
33
There are other institutional pressures that in-
crease U.S. settlement rates. These factors include
(1) the FCC's regulations to prevent whipsawing
by decreasing incentives to lower accounting
129 See In re Policy Statement on International Account-
ing Rate Reform, Policy Statement, 11 FCC Rcd. 3146, 3147,
para. 9 (1996).
130 See FCC, CCB INDUSTRY ANALYSIs DIVISION, TRENDS IN
THE U.S INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, at
tbl.24 (authored by Linda Blake &Jim Lande) (1999). This
number includes settlement payments and receipts for inter-
national telephone, telex, and telegraph. The following re-
flects the settlement data for the past five years, in millions of
U.S. dollars:
Settlement Settlement
Year Receipts Payments Deficit
1993 2,938 6,645 3,707
1994 31003 7,294 4,291
1995 3,073 8,016 4,943
1996 2,829 8,484 5,655
1997 2,865 8,315 5,450
131 See Frieden, supra note 128, at 115 n.1l.
132 See Bryan Gruley & Douglas Lavin, U.S. Aims to Reduce
Rates for International Phone Calls, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Nov. 18,
1996, at 3.
133 See Stanley, supra note 107, at 431.
134 See Frieden, supra note 128, at 114.
135 Accounting rates are often set in Special Drawing
Rights ("SDR"), which is an international currency unit that
is determined by the International Monetary Fund and based
rates, 13 4 (2) the fact that prices are set in U.S. dol-
lars whereas accounting rates are calculated in
monetary units other than U.S. dollars, 135 (3) the
effects of taxation of telephone service in foreign
countries' 3 6 and (4) the discriminatory practice of
some countries that charge higher settlement
rates to terminate U.S. traffic than traffic from
other countries. 1
37
Increased U.S. settlement payments, however,
are mainly the result of several different market
forces. First, outbound traffic greatly exceeds in-
bound traffic. 3" The reasons for the increased
outbound traffic include the large number of
wealthy immigrants in the U.S. calling abroad, 139
the lack of direct dial and high PTT originating
costs that retard demand and usage in their re-
spective countries and the competitive market in
the U.S. that lowers cost and increases demand
and usage in this country. Second, new services
have added a third player into the international
settlements process. International 800 and third-
party billing arrangements, such as credit cards,
have created a situation where the country re-
sponsible for the billing and the settlement pay-
ments may not have originated the phone call.
For example, in a country beyond call, 140 the bill-
ing country may not be either the originating or
terminating country, yet it must pay a settlement
rate to the terminating country and the originat-
on the average of a basket of currencies. See Trade in Telecom-
munications: A Glossary of Technical Terms (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<www.itu.int>. As of Sept. 24, 1999, each SDR was worth ap-
proximately $.723. See id.
136 See Stanley, supra note 107, at 419.
137 See id. at 433.
138 See generally FCC, 1998 SECTION 43.61 INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA, (authored by Linda Blake and
Jim Lande) (2000) available at <www.fcc.gov/ccb/stats>.
139 See Gruley & Lavin, supra note 132, at 3.
140 Home country beyond enables a caller.in one coun-
try to access directly a home country direct service provider
of a second country for the purpose of placing a call termi-
nating outside the second country. ITU Database (visited
Feb. 14, 2000) <www.itu.int/sancho.html>. Home country be-
yond involves a two-stage international call and will require
the home country direct service provider to have bilateral
agreements in place with both the service access provider
and the service delivery provider which will permit calls be-
tween the origin and destination countries involved. See id.
For example, a U.S. carrier subscriber making a call from
Brazil to France would call the access number in the United
States, receive dial tone from the U.S., then call on to France.
The Brazilian operator recognizes this as a Brazil-to-U.S. call
and the French operator recognizes this as a U.S.-to-France
call. When the two legs are less expensive than a direct dial,
home country direct becomes a viable option.
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ing country, thus aggravating the settlements bal-
ance of that country. Third, uncollectable pay-
ments and calling fraud adversely affect the U.S.
based carrier since it does not collect the charge
but must pay the foreign carrier for terminating
the call. Fourth, U.S. carriers did not have a sub-
stantial incentive to lower accounting rates, until
the deregulation included in the ISP Reform Order,
because ISP regulations bound them to equal ac-
counting rates and proportional return.
C. Benchmark Settlement Rate Order
The U.S. government attempted for years to ad-
dress the settlement rate deficit and achieve cost-
based settlement rates by means of discussion and
negotiation bilaterally and multilaterally at the
ITU, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") and other interna-
tional organizations. In 1997, the Commission im-
posed caps on the amount a U.S. carrier can pay a
foreign carrier for its settlement of U.S. traffic.
41
The Benchmarks Order noted that these benchmark
settlement rates were necessary because, under
the international accounting rate system at that
the time, the settlement rates U.S. carriers paid to
foreign carriers to terminate U.S.-originated traf-
141 See generally Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806.
142 See id. at 19807, para. 2.
143 See id. The settlement rate benchmark condition
adopted in the Benchmarks Order is intended to reduce the
ability of U.S.-licensed carriers to engage in a predatory price
squeeze. See id. A price squeeze refers to a strategy of preda-
tion that would involve the foreign carrier setting high
(above-cost) international settlement rates while its U.S. affil-
iate offers "low" prices for domestic IMTS services in compe-
tition with the other carriers. See id. Because the foreign car-
rier's international termination services are a necessary input
for providing IMITS services, the foreign carrier can create a
situation where the relationship between "high" interna-
tional settlement rates and its U.S. affiliate's "low" prices for
IMTS services forces competing carriers to lose money or cus-
tomers, even if they are more efficient than the affiliate at
providing international service. See id. at 19901, para. 208.
A proposal was made by the larger domestic carriers in the
Foreign Participation Proceeding to extend this condition to
the licenses of all foreign-affiliated U.S. carriers, whether re-
sale or facilities-based authority. See Foreign Participation Order,
12 FCC Rcd. at 23979, para. 198. If implemented, arguably
such a condition would have precluded all means of the car-
rier to provide traffic on any route in which it had an affiliate
offering a settlement rate above benchmark. The Commis-
sion declined to apply the settlement rate benchmark condi-
tion to switched resale providers because the switched re-
seller has substantially less incentive to engage in a predatory
price squeeze than a facilities-based carrier. See id. Due to the
switched resellers' lack of control of essential facilities, it
fic are in most cases substantially above the cost
foreign carriers incur to terminate that traffic.1
4 2
The Commission expressed a belief that above-
cost settlement rates not only harmed U.S. con-
sumers through higher than necessary interna-
tional calling rates, but also provided funding nec-
essary for foreign carriers to finance strategies
that create competitive distortions in the market
for U.S. international services. 143 The settlement
rate deficit, which was partially the result of high
settlement rates, reached a total of $5.4 billion in
1996, double what it was in 1990.1
4 4
The benchmark rates adopted in the order are
based on a Tariff Component Price ("TCP"),
145
an average of a foreign carriers' publicly available
tariff rates and other information made available
to or estimated by the Commission. Most country
routes146 were assigned according to their eco-
nomic development, as defined by a World Bank
and ITU classification scheme. 147  The three
benchmarks adopted are fifteen cents per minute
for upper income countries; nineteen cents per
minute for upper middle income and lower mid-
dle income countries; and twenty-three cents per
minute for lower income countries.14 1 The Com-
mission would rely on petitions by interested par-
ties and the international telecommunications
could not force all facilities based-carriers to exit the market
or prevent subsequent entry. See id. at 19898, para. 199. Also,
such activity would easily be detectable by the Commission or
the underlying facilities carrier because a significant portion
of its costs, and the wholesale rate at which it takes service
from the underlying facilities-based carrier, is known or easily
attainable. See id. at 19900, para. 204.
144 See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19812, para. 13.
145 See id. at 19829, para. 49. The Tariff Component
Price ("TCP") methodology uses three network components
to calculate each country basket: (1) the "international facil-
ity component" consisting of "international transmission fa-
cilities, both cable and satellite, including the link to interna-
tional switching facilities"; (2) the "international gateway
component" consisting of "international switching centers
and associated transmission and signaling equipment"; and
(3) "national extension component," consisting of "national
exchanges, national transmission, and the local loop facilities
used to distribute international service within a country." Id.;
see also Lawrence J. Spiwak, From International Competitive Car-
rier to the WTO: A Survey of the FCC's International Telecommuni-
cations Policy Initiatives 1985-1998, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 111,
227 n.323 (1998).
146 The Benchmarks Order assigned benchmark settlement
rates for most, but not all, countries on its International
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service agreement filing obligations of U.S. carri-
ers for disclosure of these rates to determine com-
pliance.' 49 The order adopted five transition peri-
ods for U.S. carriers to negotiate settlement rates
at or below the benchmarks: one year for carriers
from upper income countries (Jan. 1, 1999); two
years for carriers from upper middle income
countries (Jan. 1, 2000); three years for carriers
from lower middle income countries (Jan. 1,
2001); four years for carriers in lower income
countries (Jan. 1, 2002); and five years for coun-
tries with telephone penetration rates that are less
than one in one-hundred (Jan. 1, 2003).150
The Commission also conditioned section 214
authorizations to provide facilities-based interna-
tional services to countries where the licensee had
an affiliate to offer settlement rates at or below
the relevant benchmark on the affiliated route.'
15
The benchmark was applied regardless of the af-
filiate's market power or ability to control settle-
ment rates in its market. 15 2 This condition prohib-
ited a U.S. carrier from using its facilities-based
149 See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51 (1998).
150 See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19816, para. 22.
151 See id. at 19910, para. 228.
152 This condition was subsequently amended in the
Benchmarks Reconsideration Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 9269-72, pa-
ras. 39-46. In that order, the Commission reasoned that the
condition for facilities-based service to affiliated markets
should apply solely to U.S. carriers that are providing service
on a route where they have an affiliate with market power.
Market power is defined as controlling more than 50 percent
of the market. See id. at 9270, para. 40. A predation strategy
would make sense for a U.S. carrier only if its foreign affiliate
had sufficient terminating facilities in the foreign market to
terminate all the traffic generated by the U.S. carriers. See id.
Because a carrier that lacks market power would most likely
lack these facilities, there is not a sufficient danger of an-
ticompetitive behavior. See id. at 9270-71, para. 41.
153 See Benchmarks Orde, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19910, para. 228.
'54 See id. at 19896, para. 192.
155 See In re International Settlement Rates, Order, 13 FCC
Rcd. 9188 (1998). This condition on section 214 licenses ob-
tained prior to Jan. 1, 1998, was stayed pending a petition
from MCI. See id. at 9184, para. 4. In June 1999, the FCC
released its Reconsideration Order in the Benchmark docket
and lifted the stay on this condition, but imposed a modified
condition where only U.S. carriers with foreign affiliates with
market power would have their facilities licenses condi-
tioned. See Benchmarks Reconsideration Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at
9269-72, paras. 39-46.
156 See MICHAEL TYLER, TRANSFORMING ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONSHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS No. 7 (vis-
ited October 4, 1999) <www.itu.int>. Refile occurs when an
operator takes its international traffic to a country where an
open competitive market and low charges apply for forward-
ing of traffic to its ultimate destination in a "third" country.
See id. Refile is selected in order to minimize the originating
operator's cost for terminating internal calls. See id. The ter-
authority to provide switched service on a route
unless the foreign affiliate offered settlement
rates at or below the relevant benchmark. '5 The
Commission's concern was that foreign-affiliated
international services licensees operating in the
United States could engage in anticompetitive be-
havior through a price squeeze. This would harm
unaffiliated U.S. carriers and would eventually re-
sult in a decrease in competition on the particular
route. 154 The condition affected foreign affiliated
licensees because they would have to cease service
on the affiliated route unless its foreign affiliate
offered U.S. carriers benchmark settlement rates
by April 1, 1998.155
The Commission recognized that routing and
bypass arrangements such as refile,' 56 switched
hubbing 157 and International Simple Resale, 158 as
well as increased competition and development
on the foreign end, were placing downward pres-
sure on accounting rates. However, through its
Benchmarks Order, the Commission returned to a
ratemaking methodology similar to the treatment
minating operator sees this traffic as originating in the mid-
dle country, not the originating country, and therefore will
charge the accounting rate agreed to between these carriers.
See id. This is distinct from transit traffic, which is part of the
traditional settlement systems and would disclose the
originating country to the terminating operator. See id.
157 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3938, para. 169.
"Switched hubbing" refers to the practice of hubbing in-
bound or out-bound traffic through an "equivalent" country
from or to a non-equivalent country. See id. This practice
placed downward pressure on accounting rates since carriers
could aggregate their traffic through a competitive market
and route collectively to or from a less competitive market.
See id.
158 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23924,
para. 72. International Simple Resale ("ISR") refers to the
provisioning of switched basic service via international pri-
vate lines interconnected to the public switched telephone
network at one or both ends. See id. ISR allows a carrier to
provide international switched traffic outside the accounting
rate system, thus placing downward pressure on accounting
rates. See In re Regulation of International Accounting Rates
(Phase 1I), First Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 559, 560, para.
12 (1991). The Commission permitted ISR on select routes
that it determined offered "equivalent" resale opportunities
to U.S. carriers, a test that is similar, but not the same as
ECO. See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3926, para. 138.
At this time, the Commission will permit ISR on a WTO
member nation route if the market is proved to be
"equivalent" or at least 50 percent of the settled U.S.-billed
traffic on the route or routes in question are at or below the
relevant benchmark settlement rate. See Foreign Participation
Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23927, para. 79. For non-WTO member
country routes, the market must satisfy both the equivalency
test and the 50-percent settlement test. Foreign Participation
Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23944, para. 129 n.251.
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of dominant, incumbent local exchange carriers.
Unlike rate-of-return or price-cap methodology,
the Commission based its settlement rates on in-
formation gathered from interested parties and
unreliable sources, 159 such as tariffs that included
uncollectables, universal service and other irrele-
vant costs,'" and averaged all of these costs to-
gether rather than assigning rates on an individ-
ual country basis.
The Benchmarks Order was extremely beneficial
to U.S. carriers and strongly disadvantaged for-
eign carriers, foreign-affiliated U.S. carriers and
ultimately U.S. consumers. Unlike the mandated
reduction in similar domestic scenarios, no U.S.
facilities-based carrier was obliged to flow through
any of the cost savings associated with the lower
settlement rates in the form of lower collection
rates to U.S. consumers."' The FCC and state reg-
ulatory authorities often require domestic long-
distance providers to demonstrate access charge
reductions through tariff filings and flow-through
plans. 162 In the case of international traffic, the
Commission concluded the marketplace would
pass these rate reductions on to consumers.
The order was unclear on how the conditions
in the Benchmarks Order were to be enforced.
Clearly, facilities-based section 214 licenses were
conditioned on affiliated routes and new require-
ments were imposed for ISR routes, 16:  but the
Commission did not elaborate how it would en-
force the benchmark rates on unaffiliated routes.
If a country's international carriers are not offer-
ing benchmark rates by the dates indicated in the
order, the Commission stated that it would work
159 See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19855, para. 102.
The Commission admitted that the use of tariff data to calcu-
late settlement rate benchmarks is that any inefficiencies in
foreign carriers' tariffed prices will be noted in the TCP. See
id.
160 See id. Cost information submitted by domestic carri-
ers was not made readily available on the record for foreign
interests to question. See Cable & Wireless PLC v. FCC, 166
F.3d 1224, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
1 iI See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19930, para. 270.
The Commission held that the combination of new entrants
into the market, the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement, and its
settlement rate policy would lower costs and increase compe-
tition, thus not necessitating a pass-through requirement. See
id.
16"2 See, e.g., 1n reGranting Petitions for Simplified Review
and Approval of Flow-Through of Access Charge Reductions,
Order, North Carolina Utilities Commission, Dkt. No. P-100,
SUB 72, et al. (June 15, 1999) (exemplifying the mandatory
flow through of access charge reductions imposed by many
state public utility commissions).
with the appropriate government authorities to
lower the settlement rates by emphasizing cooper-
ation and the decisions of the ITU in Recommen-
dation D.140. 164 Ironically, this unilaterally im-
posed rate cap relied on bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms for enforcement. U.S. carriers may
request Commission action in such circumstances
by filing a petition that (1) demonstrates that they
have been unable to negotiate a settlement rate
with its foreign correspondent in compliance with
the order and (2) requests enforcement measures
to be initiated to ensure that no U.S. carrier pays
the foreign correspondent an amount exceeding
the lawful settlement rate benchmark.
Enforcement of the Benchmarks Order began in
June 1999, when the Commission's International
Bureau, pursuant to petitions filed by AT&T, MCI
WorldCom and Sprint, ordered all U.S. carriers to
pay the benchmark settlement rate of fifteen
cents per minute on the U.S.-Cyprus and U.S.-Ku-
wait routes. 165 In Cyprus, the petitioners had un-
successfully attempted to negotiate with the Cy-
prus Telecommunications Authority to lower its
settlement rate to fifteen cents from their rate of
thirty-seven cents per minute. 16 6 Likewise, the
Commission released a similar order based on the
petitioners' claim that the negotiations had been
fruitless to lower the settlement rate of Kuwait
from seventy-eight cents per minute to the bench-
mark rate. 167
While both of these disputes are ongoing and
the Benchmarks Order failed to specify particular
enforcement actions, there is Commission prece-
dent in international accounting rate disputes. In
163 In the Benchmarks Order, the Commission required
carriers to satisfy the "equivalency" test for ISR and demon-
strate at least 50 percent of the settled, U.S.-billed traffic on
the route is at or below the appropriate settlement rate
benchmark. See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19917, para.
243. This condition was subsequently amended in the Foreign
Participation Orderby exempting the equivalency test on WTO
member nation routes. See id. at 19922-23, para. 259.
164 See id. at 19893, para. 185.
165 See In re AT&T Corp., MCI WorldCom, Inc., Sprint
Communications Co., L.P.; Petition for Enforcement of In-
ternational Settlements Benchmark Rates for Service with Cy-
prus, Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 8874 (1999) [hereinafter Cyprus Or-
der]; See aLso In re AT&T Corp., MCI WorldCom, Inc. Sprint
Communications Co., L.P.; Petition for Enforcement of In-
ternational Settlements Benchmark Rates for Service with
Kuwait, Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 8868 (1999) [hereinafter Kuwait
Order].
166 See Cyprus Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 8874, para. 15.
167 See Kuwait Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 8868, para. 15.
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1996, the Commission ordered all U.S. carriers to
cease providing settlements payments to Telintar,
the monopoly provider of international switched
service in Argentina, due to anticompetitive ac-
tions taken during a contract dispute with
AT&T.' 68 Eventually, Telintar made the most eco-
nomical choice under the circumstances and
ceased these practices; traffic eventually resumed.
D. Response and Appeal
A number of foreign carriers and administra-
tions took issue with the Commission's unilateral
imposition of settlement rate restrictions. Most of
the ninety commentors to the Commission's no-
tice opposed the Commission's unilateral ap-
proach to high settlement rates and questioned
the Commission's reliance on the TCP and the
lack of information on how these rates were deter-
mined. 1 69 These opponents requested that the
Commission rely instead on market forces and
multilateral negotiations to make settlement rates
cost-based.' 70 On the other hand, domestic inter-
ests applauded the implementation of the order
and requested that the Commission provide even
more downward pressure on these rates.
171
Several adversely affected parties challenged
the Commission's order in the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals. 172 Petitioners, including various parties rep-
resenting over 100 foreign governments, regula-
tors, and telecommunications companies,
challenged the Benchmarks Order on several
grounds. First and foremost, they claimed that the
FCC, by limiting the settlement rates foreign carri-
ers may charge U.S. carriers, had asserted extra-
territorial jurisdiction over foreign carriers and
foreign telecommunications services, thereby ex-
168 See In reAT&T Corp. Proposed Extension of Account-
ing Rate Agreement for Switched Voice with Argentina, Or-
der, 11 FCC Rcd. 18014 (1996); see also Spiwak, supra note
145, at 164.
169 See generally Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806.
170 See id. at 19814-15, at para. 18.
171 See id. at 19854.
172 See generally Cable & Wireless, P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d
1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
173 See id. at 1229.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See id. at 1230.
177 See id..at 1229.
178 See Cable & Wireless, 166 F.3d at 1230.
179 See id. at 1231.
180 See id.
ceeding its authority under the Communications
Act and the International Telecommunications
Union Treaty. 173 Second, even if the Benchmarks
Order did not regulate foreign carriers, it unlaw-
fully regulated domestic carriers by restricting the
prices they may pay to non-FCC-regulated enti-
ties. 174 Third, the benchmark settlement rates set
by the Commission were arbitrary, capricious and
unsupported by substantial evidence on the rec-
ord, and the Commission's conditioning of the
section 214 licenses held by foreign-affiliated car-
riers was unlawfully discriminatory and inade-
quately justified. 
75
The Court held in favor of the Commission on
each of these grounds. First, the Court held that
the Benchmarks Order does not regulate foreign
carriers or foreign telecommunications services
and therefore does not violate the Communica-
tions Act. 176 The benchmark rates apply only to
what U.S. carriers, subject to the Commission's ju-
risdiction, may pay for termination of U.S.-
originated traffic.17 7 Although the effect of this
regulation may impact foreign carriers, that alone
does not result in the FCC exceeding its jurisdic-
tion. Second, the court rejected the petitioner's
arguments that the Communications Act only per-
mits the Commission to regulate the terms by
which U.S. carriers offer telecommunications serv-
ices to the public, not the prices U.S. carriers pay
to non-FCC-regulated entities for goods and serv-
ices.'1 7 The D.C. Circuit cited several sections of
the Communications Act, including section 201179
(ratemaking authority), section 205180 (authority
to declare a practice unlawful) and section 211181
(authority to mandate amendments to contracts
filed with the Commission), as well as the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine,' 82 which provides the Commis-
181 See id. at 1231-32.
182 See generally FCC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S.
348 (1956); United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S.
332 (1956) (referred to as the "Mobile-Sierra Doctrine").
Under this doctrine, "the Commission has the power to pre-
scribe a change in contract rates when it finds them to be
unlawful . .. and to modify other provisions of private con-
tracts when necessary to serve the public interest." Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1495, 1501 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
Although the legal standard for changing contract rates,
(they must be 'unlawful') differs from the standard for
changing other contract provisions (they must disserve
'the public interest'), in fact the two standards are not
very different. Before changing rates, the Commission
must make. a finding that they are 'unlawful' according
to the terms of the governing statute, which typically re-
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sion with the authority to prescribe maximum set-
tlement rates. 83 Third, the court rejected the ar-
gument that the Benchmarks Order violated the
Administrative Procedure Act by calculating rates
that undercompensate foreign carriers or by
drawing conclusions on data not included on the
record.8 4 It held that the reliance on the TCP
methodology was justifiable because foreign carri-
ers did not produce cost information on the rec-
ord that would enable the Commission to rely on
more accurate information. 18 5 The decision was
not appealed.
E. ISP Reform Order
The Commission's International Settlements
Policy was addressed in the 1998 biennial re-
view.' 86 Pursuant to its section 11(a)(2) biennial
review criteria, the Commission held that in most
circumstances the ISP is no longer necessary or in
the public interest as the result of meaningful eco-
nomic competition in the international telecom-
munications market. 8 7 The Commission found
that in most circumstances the ISP reduced incen-
tives for U.S. carriers to negotiate low settlement
rates, because the rate provided to one carrier is
available to all carriers.' 8 It also found that "the
proportionate return requirement of the ISP can
distort competition in the U.S. market," and im-
pede the entrance of new competitors 18 9 and that
the uniform settlement rates and public disclo-
sure requirements inhibit competition at the re-
tail level. 190
The Commission removed its ISP require-
ments-but not the benchmark settlement
rates-for settlement agreements with foreign
carriers lacking market power.' 91 The Commis-
sion originally proposed removing the ISP for ar-
rangements with non-dominant carriers in WTO
quires a finding that existing rates are unjust, Unreasona-
ble, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.
Id.
183 See Cable & Wireless, 166 F.3d at 1232.
184 See id. at 1232-34.
185 See id. at 1233.
186 See generally ISP Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 7963.
187 See id. at 7964, para. 2.
188 See id. at 7972, para. 24.
189 See id. at 7972, para. 25.
190 See ISP Reform Order 14 FCC Rcd. at 7973, para. 27.
19' See id. at 7973, para. 29.
192 See In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Reform of
the International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing
Requirements, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd.
member nations.' 2 However, the order included
all such arrangements, concluding that a carrier
without market power will be unable to adversely
affect competition in the U.S. regardless of its
home country's membership in the WTO. 193 Fur-
ther, on certain select routes where the U.S. in-
bound traffic is settled at twenty-five percent or
more below the prescribed benchmark rate, the
ISP was entirely eliminated even for arrangements
with the dominant carrier. 19 4 Arrangements with
the dominant carrier still have to be filed with the
Commission, but these filings are no longer pub-
licly available. 195 This filing is required to ensure
that U.S. carriers do not enter into arrangements
that would allow the foreign carrier to exercise its
market power to the detriment of U.S. consum-
ers. '16 However, the order recognized that public
disclosure could have a chilling effect on pro-com-
petitive termination arrangements. 1
97
The ISP Reform Order correctly recognized that a
regulatory system originally implemented to gov-
ern telegraph traffic between monopoly providers
is no longer applicable in this age of multiple op-
erators, least of all cost routing and internet te-
lephony. 1"-18 The Commission stopped short of
abandoning the ISP altogether, clearly recogniz-
ing that, under most circumstances, regulatory
oversight and mandated disclosure of costs are
unnecessary and potentially harmful in the inter-
national telecommunications market.199 Never-
theless, the Commission still maintains its
benchmarks-although one of its primary means
of monitoring such costs has been eliminated-
and it has not demonstrated any willingness to
abandon them in place of market pressures.
IV. POST-REVIEW
During 1999, the Commission enforcement of
15320 (1998) [hereinafter ISP Reform NPRA].
193 See ISP Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 7971, para. 20.
l194 See id. at 7982, para. 52. At the time the order was
released, these routes included Canada, the United King-
dom, Sweden, Germany, France, Hong Kong, the Nether-
lands, Denmark, and Norway. See Commission Releases List
of International Routes that Satisfy Criteria for Relief from
the International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing
Requirements, Public Notice, 14 FCC Rcd. 12158 (1999).
'95 See ISP Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 7989, para 67.
196 See id. at 7989, para. 69.
197 See id.
198 See id. at 7964, para. 2.
199 See id. at 7965, para. 6.
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the "public interest," the statutory standard by
which it regulates international telecommunica-
tions and the entry of foreign carriers, can be con-
cluded to be a mix of pro-U.S. consumer regula-
tion and U.S. carrier protectionism. These are
neither mutually exclusive nor fundamentally
consistent objectives. The Market Entry Order, with
its evidentiary standard obligations on foreign-af-
filiated carriers, and the Benchmarks Order, with its
mandatory cost reductions and absent flow-
through obligations, had the effect of protecting
U.S. carriers and raising barriers to foreign carrier
entry. Lack of entry and maintenance of the status
quo for the larger U.S. international carriers ef-
fectively delayed the benefits of competition for
U.S. consumers. On the other hand, the Commis-
sion did embrace competition in the entry stan-
dards created in the Foreign Participation Order and
the deregulation of the international settlements
policy. Cost disclosures and increased entry into
the market by providers with less regulatory over-
sight increase the competitiveness of all carriers in
the market, resulting in increased choices and
lower prices for the U.S. consumer.
The Commission has also moved to a more rea-
sonable regulatory position in considering its lim-
ited resources. The need to release multiple or-
ders for carriers with few, if any, affiliates in
foreign countries delayed the effect of this com-
petitive pressure on the incumbent domestic car-
riers. Global 214 licenses increased applications
on streamlined review and the refusal to automati-
cally remove an application from streamline re-
view exclusively due to an objection by a compet-
ing carrier further reduced the time of obtaining
authorization for foreign-affiliated carriers.
200
In its Year 2000 biennial review, the Commis-
sion can do more to embrace the pro-U.S. con-
sumer model of open competition in the interna-
tional telecommunications market. The domestic
interexchange and CMRS markets are examples
of low barriers to entry and vigorous competition
200 See Streamlining Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 12886, para. 3;
See Licensing Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 4912-13, para. 8.
201 47 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) ("[The
Commission] shall determine whether any such regulation is
no longer necessary in the public interest as the result of
meaningful economic competition between providers of
such service.").
202 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23913,
para. 50.
203 See ISP Reform NPRM, 13 FCC Rcd. at 15326-27, para.
15. Both countries use a competition authority to monitor
benefiting the U.S. consumer. The following is-
sues, examined under the criteria established in
section 11(a) (2) of the 1996 Act, 20 1 should be
considered in the upcoming 2000 review.
A. Abandon the Effective Competitive
Opportunities Test for all International
Services Applications.
ECO no longer necessarily serves the public in-
terest because the international services market
has become competitive, even on non-WTO mem-
ber nation routes. The Commission should ex-
tend the open-entry criteria it currently provides
applicants from WTO member nations to appli-
cants from all nations. The rebuttable presump-
tion that entry will benefit the market,20 2 can be
conditioned or-in very unusual circumstances-
denied if the licensee engages in conduct that vio-
lates the Commission's rules. Rather than erect-
ing barriers to entry and competition, the Com-
mission should adopt the role of marketplace
protector, similar to that of the telecommunica-
tions authorities in Australia and New Zealand.
20 3
Internet telephony, refile, reorigination of traffic
and other non-traditional means of exchanging
international traffic have changed the market-
place and the necessary regulatory protections.
Open-entry will allow more carriers into the U.S.
market, compounding the competitive effect of
these alternative routing arrangements. Foreign
market entry for U.S. carriers will be achieved
more rapidly through the exercise of multilateral
and bilateral negotiating power, such as the WTO,
rather than through erection of regulatory barri-
ers in this country.
B. Amend the Commission's Affiliation
Standard.
The Commission's rules contain several differ-
ent definitions of "affiliate" or "affiliation."2 0 4 For
their telecommunications markets. See id. This replaces pro-
phylactic regulations with a competitiveness system that will
not interfere with the marketplace to the same extent. See id.
204 For example, the Commission sets the affiliate stan-
dard at control for purposes of protecting consumer infor-
mation from being used in violation of its CPNI rules. See gen-
erally In re Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer
Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Infor-
mation, Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
FCC Rcd. 8061 (1998). In its attempt to prevent affiliates of
Foreign Signatories from using their rights as signatories in
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international regulatory purposes, affiliation is a
twenty-five percent equity interest or a controlling
interest at any level. This affiliation standard is no
longer necessary to serve the public interest. The
competitive pressures preclude any foreseeable at-
tempt to engage in the anticompetitive behavior
the Commission seeks to prevent. Instead, the
Commission should rely on a fifty-percent control
standard, which may include a plurality ownership
level in the carrier.
To effectuate a price squeeze or other anticom-
petitive behavior, the U.S. carrier and foreign-af-
filiated carriers would have to engage in an illegal,
high-risk operation of providing service below
cost for an extended period of time until other
market participants exit the market. It is purely
theoretical and highly unlikely that a non-control-
ling minority interest could convince the control-
ling interest to engage in such activity and suc-
ceed to the point where it would effectuate the
harm the Commission is seeking to prevent. The
Commission should recognize the improbability
of such behavior in this market and apply ECO or
its dominant carrier safeguards only when the ap-
plicant is controlling or is controlled by the for-
eign carrier in the destination market.
Further, the Commission should recognize the
inability of a U.S. carrier to force a change in the
affiliate's settlement rates unless it has defacto con-
trol over the foreign carrier. U.S. carriers that are
"affiliated" with a foreign carrier under the Com-
mission's current rules, but do not have a level of
interest in the foreign carrier to exercise control
of its operations, have their own facilities authori-
zations conditioned on the foreign carrier's com-
pliance with the benchmark settlement rates. This
condition could unfairly preclude the U.S. carrier
from the facilities market on this route due to the
actions of a foreign carrier that the U.S. carrier
an anticompetitive manner when receiving direct access to
INTELSAT, the Commission uses a fifty percent standard. See
In re Direct Access to the INTELSAT System, Report and Order,
14 FCC Rcd. 15703 (1999).See also supra note 47 for a discus-
sion of the Commission's change in affiliation standards.
potentially could not influence or direct due to its
non-controlling interest.
C. Modify the Benchmark Settlement Rates to
Recognize Calling Party Pays.
In many foreign nations, mobile traffic costs are
the responsibility of the party that originated the
call, not always the mobile user as in the United
States. Many believe this system stimulates growth
and the use of wireless services, and the Commis-
sion commenced a proceeding to determine if it
would be appropriate in the United States.
205
Calling Party Pays ("CPP") is currently impacting
the settlement arrangements of U.S. international
carriers that are complying with the Benchmarks
Order. Because CPP costs are the responsibility of
the caller in the originating country, they result in
a hidden surcharge on settlement rates paid for
international service. These surcharges are added
to the present settlement rates and can result in
some cases in rates that exceed the applicable
benchmark. This is a particular concern for U.S.
carriers that are affiliated on the route and pro-
viding service on a facilities basis.
D. Eliminate Any Remaining Cost Disclosures.
All remaining requirements to disclose costs or
make cost information publicly available are no
longer in the public interest as the result of mean-
ingful competition between service providers. In
the ISP Reform Order, the Commission correctly
recognized that the disclosure of cost information
by regulatory mandate can harm competition.
The Commission should extend this conclusion
to other carrier-to-carrier contracts the Commis-
sion currently requires to be filed and made avail-
able to interested parties.
2°6
205 See generally In re Calling Party Pays Service Offering in
the Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Declaratory Ruling and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 10861 (1999).
206 See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51 (1998).
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